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By combining new data on bilateral asset holdings with data on securities regulation in an 
empirical gravity model, it is found that bilateral differences in securities regulation lead to 
decreased portfolio holdings. Hence, regulatory harmonization can foster financial 
integration. The results are especially strong for equity holdings. It is verified that the results 
do not just reflect general economic, institutional, and cultural differences. Additional 
analysis of causality shows the exogenous component of asset holdings to be associated with 
larger differences in securities regulation. This might suggest that regulatory differences are 
used to protect domestic capital markets from outside competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper finds strong evidence that investors are more prone to hold portfolio assets in 
countries with similarly structured frameworks of securities regulation as their home country. 
The result implies that the harmonization of securities regulation can promote large increases 
in the integration of international capital markets. To any observer of the policy debate on the 
international aspects of securities regulation, this result is likely to seem obvious. For 
example, the conclusion reached in the European Commission’s Financial Sector Action Plan 
(EU, 1999), and later the Lamfalussy Report (EU, 2001) was that the harmonization of 
regulatory standards is a definite pre-requisite for the creation of a truly integrated European 
capital market. In the global context, there are ongoing efforts to develop and coordinate 
regulatory frameworks through various standard-setting bodies and international financial 
institutions.
1 However, that the harmonization of regulatory systems actually promotes 
financial integration is – to the best of my knowledge – an assertion made without backing of 
any systematic research prior to this study.
2 
 
To study the issue at hand, an empirical gravity model of bilateral portfolio holdings is 
estimated using data recently made available by the IMF. Indices of regulatory differences are 
constructed using data on securities regulation from La Porta et al. (2003) and on investor 
protection from La Porta et al. (1998). Rather than using the aggregate indices of regulatory 
quality derived by these authors, the sub-components of their indices are used to construct 
country-pair specific measures of regulatory differences. Home- and host-country fixed 
effects as well as standard controls for bilateral trade relations, including bilateral trade 
volumes and differences in the level of economic development, are introduced to rule out a 
spurious relationship. Although differences in both religious beliefs and general institutional 
quality appear to have strong negative impacts on bilateral asset holdings, it is verified that 
the results for regulatory differences remain robust even after taking these effects into 
                                                 
1 Examples of standard setting bodies are the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). Some of the main international financial 
institutions are the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. Interaction between these also occurs. The IMF has for 
example, launched its Financial Sector Assessment Program that, among other things, documents compliance 
with the IOSCO standards. Jordan and Majnoni (2003) present a concise overview of the process of financial 
globalization and regulatory harmonization.   
2 This said, Buch (2003) finds that the adaptation of EU:s single market program and of the Basle capital accord 
has led to increased cross-border banking activity. Although this can be interpreted as being the result of the 
harmonization regulatory systems, the variables used by Buch do not directly measure regulatory differences 
between countries.   2
account. Among the important further findings are the facts that the effect of regulatory 
differences is mainly at work among relatively rich countries, and that this effect is more 
pronounced for equity than for long-term debt holdings. As differences in the regulatory 
framework are derived using data mainly related to equity markets, this last finding offers 
further support for the conclusion of this paper.  
 
Since it is plausible that the regulatory framework is harmonized between major investment 
partners, the direction of causality is a major issue. This problem is tackled using instrumental 
variables to investigate both how the exogenous component of regulatory differences affects 
bilateral asset holdings, and how the exogenous component of asset holdings affects 
regulatory differences. Surprisingly, instrumented asset holdings are found to be associated 
with  larger regulatory differences. This offers support for the hypothesis that regulatory 
differences are sometimes used to protect domestic capital markets from outside competition 
(e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
 
Naturally, this is not the first study of the institutional determinants of international 
investments in a gravity setting. Improved data availability has resulted in a rapid increase in 
this literature. In a panel of countries, Portes and Rey (2003) find distance and other proxies 
of information costs to be good predictors of bilateral asset flows. These findings are 
confirmed by di Giovanni (2004) who estimates a gravity model for M&A deals. He also 
finds that the level of financial development in the acquiring country is an important 
determinant of investments abroad. In a related study, Rossi and Volpin (2003) find that 
M&A activity is higher in countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder 
protection. Consistent with di Giovanni, they also find that merger targets are usually located 
in countries with lower quality investor protection than that of the acquirers. Mody et al. 
(2003) estimate a somewhat different version of the gravity model and find host-country 
creditor rights to be positively related to the ratio between inward FDI and trade, but not to 
the ratio between portfolio inflows and trade. Wei (2000) estimates the impact of corruption 
on bilateral FDI flows and he finds that the negative impact of host-country corruption on 
inflows is even larger than the effect of host country taxation. Using a database on emerging 
market funds, Gelos and Wei (2002) find that mutual funds tend to hold less equity in 
countries with less transparent government and corporate disclosure.  
   3
The present paper is also related to the large literature on the home bias of portfolio holdings.
3 
Recent contributions to this literature have stressed explanations based on informational rather 
than institutional factors.
4 Since the results here suggest that regulatory differences can cause 
(or increase) informational costs, the possibility of separating these types of explanations may 
have been exaggerated.  
 
Finally, the study is related to the literature on law and finance (starting with La Porta et al., 
1998). Cross-country differences in securities regulation and investor protection appear to 
affect virtually all measurable aspects of domestic financing decisions.
5 With the exception of 
the few studies mentioned above, the international dimension of these differences is, however, 
largely unexplored and this paper aims at filling this gap.  
 
Regulatory harmonization and regulatory competition are also discussed in disciplines such as 
law, accounting, and political science. Although it is impossible to provide a comprehensive 





One of the basic motives for harmonizing securities regulation is to reduce the costs of 
investing in different markets.
6 The lack of Europe-wide securities regulation is for example 
regularly blamed for hindering the integration of EU financial markets by raising the costs of 
cross-border financial intermediation (EU, 2001; Vives, 2001). The costs caused by 
regulatory heterogeneity involve the cost of learning about the regulatory system in various 
markets and the cost of obeying multiple regulations serving the same final objective.
7 In the 
extreme, two regulatory systems can be mutually contradictory, thereby making compliance 
                                                 
3 See Lewis (1999) for a survey. 
4 Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) convincingly highlight the role of informational costs by first documenting 
a strong preference among investment managers for local assets even within the US, and then showing that fund 
managers earn abnormal returns on nearby investments. 
5 For evidence of the effect on domestic stock market development see La Porta et al. (1997, 2003); on the cost 
of capital, see Hali and Leuz (2003); on corporate earnings management, see Leuz et al. (2003); on the 
concentration of ownership and control, see La Porta et al. (1999). Note that this is just a partial list of the huge 
“law and finance” literature.  
6 Niemayer (2001) provides an analytical survey of the rationale behind securities regulation in general.  
7 Sykes (1999) provides an example: In order to ensure the solvency of banks, one country might impose capital 
adequacy regulation, while another country might directly regulate the riskiness of the banks’ portfolios directly. 
Banks operating in both markets must incur the costs of complying with both regulations.    4
with both logically impossible. Even in a situation where the domestic regulatory frameworks 
were completely harmonized, the international dimension might make the legal status of 
international securities contracts unclear, thereby increasing the costs of international 
investments. The differences in regulatory standards increase the costs of international 
investments even further. Given that harmonization reduces the cost of making cross-border 
investments, it would increase integration and competition in securities markets and hence 
ultimately increase the efficiency in global capital allocation.  
 
These efficiency gains come at a cost, however. At least to some extent, regulatory 
differences reflect differences in tastes, values, needs and incomes across economies. 
Harmonization forcing authorities to deviate from the preferred regulatory framework can 
thus easily be welfare reducing. Another potential cost of harmonization is related to the 
dynamic aspects of regulatory development. Since it is difficult (or even impossible) to 
construct the perfect system of securities regulation from purely theoretical considerations, 
competition between regulatory systems can be crucial in learning about what works and what 
does not work in securities regulation. Harmonization runs the risk of limiting regulatory 
competition and hence, of lowering the long-term regulatory quality. Reforming already 
agreed upon international standards can also prove to be prohibitively cumbersome, thus 
increasing this risk even further. This said, the regulatory system is always susceptible to 
capture by interest groups aiming at using diverging regulatory standards in order to limit 
competition or in other ways serving narrow interests. Given the opacity of its regulatory 
framework, the financial sector might be especially vulnerable to such capture.
8 
 
Since the costs of reducing regulatory competition are extremely difficult to measure, a policy 
aimed at harmonizing regulations should be based on a clear understanding that it will achieve 
the benefits of increased market integration. This paper aims at increasing this understanding. 
 
3. Empirical method 
 
                                                 
8 A classic reference on the public-choice theory of regulation is Stigler (1971). Recently, Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) have found support for the idea that industry incumbents use financial regulation to protect domestic 
capital markets from outside competition. For a discussion of the difficult trade-offs connected to the 
harmonization of financial regulation, with a special emphasis on European company and takeover law, see 
Hertig and McCahery (2003).   5
To asses the impact of differences in securities regulation on asset market integration, I use a 
gravity equation framework traditionally used to study international trade flows. The gravity 
equation links the logarithm of bilateral trade volumes to the joint exporter and importer GDP, 
as well as measures of distance between countries.
9 Rather than using bilateral trade as the 
dependent variable, I use the logarithm of portfolio asset holdings in country j by residents in 
country i. The set of explanatory variables is described below. The explanatory variable of 
main interest is an index of the differences in securities regulation between countries i and j. 
Hence, the following baseline relationship is estimated using OLS:  
 
ln(1 + PORTINVij) = α1 SECREGDIFFij + α2 ln(DISTij) + α3 ln(GDPPCDIFFij)  
+ α4 ln(TRADEij) + α5 COMLANij + α6 BORDERij + α7 REGTRADEij  
+ Σ α8, i Di + Σ α9, j Dj + εij .  
 
PORTINV are portfolio asset holdings by country i in country j, SECREGDIFF is the index 
of differences in securities regulation between i and j, and DIST is the distance between the 
countries. GDPPCDIFF is the absolute value of differences in per capita GDP, meant to 
capture differences in general economic and institutional development. TRADE is the volume 
of bilateral trade which is highly correlated with portfolio investments and likely to be caused 
by similar underlying factors. COMLAN is a dummy for countries with a common language, 
BORDER is a dummy for countries sharing a land border, REGTRADE is a vector of 
dummies indicating that both countries are members of the EU, NAFTA, USIS (the US-Israel 
free trade agreement), ANZERTA, MERCOSUR, or ASEAN. Di and Dj are sets of exporter 
and importer fixed effects, respectively, that capture all factors specific to the individual 
countries (among these the general quality of securities regulation). ε is the error term. Since 
the standard errors are not independent across country-pairs, they are clustered at this level. 
Usually in a gravity setting, importer and exporter GDP and land area are controlled for. Here, 
the effect of these variables is captured by the fixed effects. In regressions without fixed 
effects, the log of the source and destination country GDP, GDP per capita, population size 
and land area are included as bilateral controls. 
 
                                                 
9 For an up-to-date treatment of the theory and empirics on the gravity equation, see Feenstra (2004). Portes and 
Rey (2003) show that the gravity equation works well to explain bilateral asset flows. Rossi and Volpin (2003) 
and di Giovanni (2004) show similar results for bilateral M&A deals, while Wei (2000) and Mody et al. (2003) 
successfully use this approach to explain bilateral FDI-flows.   6
One important aspect of the empirical approach should be noted. The measure of regulatory 
differences takes on the same value for each country-pair. A symmetric effect for asset 
holdings by country A in country B and by country B in country A is therefore assumed. 
While this is indeed natural for a measure of regulatory differences, it is not natural for all 
types of variables. If, for example, country A had lower capital gains taxes than country B, 
this would simultaneously increase B’s asset holdings in A and decrease A’s holdings in B. 
The measure of tax differentials would naturally be positive when looking from A to B, and 
negative (and of the same size) in the opposite direction. This also implies that the variable 
would be orthogonal to regulatory differences. Hence, including variables of this type in the 
regressions would not affect the estimate of the impact of regulatory differences. Therefore, as 
long as the focus is on the impact of regulatory differences – and not on all possible 
determinants of bilateral asset holdings – only variables where the effect is expected to be 
symmetric for both source and destination countries must be included in the regressions.  
 
Naturally, the direction of causality is a major concern in this type of a study. It is easy to 
imagine a situation where countries adjust their regulations in order to comply with the 
practices in their major investment partners. This behavior would then cause the point 
estimate on the index of regulatory differences to be downward biased (i.e. larger in absolute 
value). Another possibility is the reverse. As pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (2003), it is 
possible that countries use the regulation of financial markets as a protectionist tool to limit 
the competition from outsiders. If this were true, the point estimate on regulatory differences 
would be biased towards zero.  
 
Measurement error is another problem that would cause a bias of the point estimates towards 
zero. Since any proxy for regulatory differences will be measured with error, this is a real 
concern. In order to deal with both this problem and the problem of reverse causality, 
instrumental variables will be extensively used in this study.
10    
 
4. Data and measurement issues 
 
In this section, the data used are presented and discussed. Summary statistics of the variables 
are presented in Tables 1a (bilateral variables) and 1b (country level variables). 
                                                 
10 As long as the measurement errors of a variable and its instruments are uncorrelated, an IV procedure will 
solve the problem of the downward bias in the OLS-estimates  (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2000).   7
 
4.1. Portfolio holdings 
 
Data on bilateral holdings of portfolio holdings are from the newly released Coordinated 
Portfolio Survey (CPIS) undertaken by the IMF. The purpose of this survey is to collect 
comprehensive data on the holdings of equity, and long- and short-term debt securities, 
broken down by the residence of the issuer for a wide range of countries.
11 The data were 
collected in end-December 2001 and are valued at market prices.  
 
The main variable of interest will be total portfolio holdings, the sum of the following 
subcomponents: Equity securities include all instruments and records acknowledging claims 
on the residual values of enterprises, after the claims of all creditors have been met. Shares, 
stocks, participations or similar documents (such as American Depository Receipts) usually 
denote ownership of equity. Long-term debt securities include instruments such as bonds, 
debentures, and notes that usually give the holder the unconditional right to a fixed cash flow 
or contractually determined variable money income and have an original term to maturity of 
more than one year. Short-term debt securities include treasury bills, commercial papers, and 
bankers' acceptances that usually give the holder the unconditional right to a stated fixed sum 
of money on a specified date. These instruments are usually traded on organized markets at a 
discount and have an original term to maturity of one year or less. Note that foreign direct 






The residence of holders and issuers of securities is determined by their center of economic 
interest. For enterprises, banks, mutual funds and insurance companies, this is usually their 
legal domicile. 
 
4.2. Securities regulation 
 
                                                 
11 For a thorough presentation of the data and the methods used in collecting them, see IMF (2002). The data can 
be downloaded at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.    8
To construct proxies of the differences in securities regulation, this study draws heavily on the 
work on the legal framework regulating financial markets by La Porta et al. (e.g. 1998, 2003). 
These authors have greatly influenced the study of financial markets by both posing questions 
of how these markets are affected by different regulatory regimes, and making detailed 
indices of these regimes available to other researchers.  
 
The most recent study by La Porta et al. (2003) presents an extensive examination of the 
securities laws in a wide selection of countries. The data underlying their paper are based on 
the answers to a questionnaire on the laws, statues and regulations on each country’s major 
stock exchange as of December 2000, sent to attorneys in the sample of countries. In total, 
they report data on 21 sub-categories which are then classified between zero and one. Several 
indices regarding various aspects of securities regulations are constructed from these answers. 
The first of these is an index of the disclosure requirements of an issuer of new securities. The 
second indicates the “burden of proof” regarding questionable information in the prospectus 
for new securities issuance. These indices are then combined to a “private enforcement” 
index. Public enforcement securities regulation is taken into account by an index of the 
independence and effectiveness of the main supervisor of the securities markets, an index of 
the investigative powers of the main supervisor, an index of the non-criminal sanctions of 
securities laws violations, and an index of the criminal sanctions of securities violations. 
These indices are combined to form an index of “public enforcement”.  
 
Rather than focusing on the aggregate indices on regulatory quality presented in La Porta et 
al. (2003), however, I will use the sub-components of the different indices to create measures 
of the regulatory differences between each country-pair. In practice, this means that indices of 
the following type will be calculated (details on the exact construction of the indices are 
presented in the appendix): 
 
Regulatory Differenceij = Σ |REGti – REGtj| , t = 1, …, n, 
 
where n is the number of sub-components of the original regulatory index, and REGti is the 
value of sub-component t in country i. This way of measuring differences means that two 
countries can have regulatory frameworks of the same quality, while simultaneously 
displaying large differences in the regulatory structure. Since the underlying indices are 
additive, country-pairs where both trading partners have top (or bottom) quality of   9
regulations, will also display zero differences in the structure of these. By necessity, the 
largest differences in regulatory structure will be between countries with high- and low-
quality regulatory systems.  
 
The most comprehensive index uses all 21 sub-categories reported by La Porta et al. and 
combines them into an index of total differences in securities regulation labelled 
SECREGDIFF. Table 2 shows the country-pairs with differences in SECREGDIFF in the 
lowest and highest percentiles and at the median. Just looking at the table suggests that 
differences in securities regulation reflect more than differences in general economic 
development. The largest difference can be found between the United States and Belgium, 
while one of the smallest differences is between the United States and the Philippines. Indeed, 
the correlation between SECREGDIFF and the absolute value of differences in per capita 




In order to investigate the impact of differences in various aspects of securities regulation, I 
again follow La Porta et al. (2003) and construct an index of differences in disclosure rules 
(DISCLOSEDIFF) using six sub-categories, an index of differences in private enforcement 
(PRIVATEDIFF) using nine sub-categories, and an index of differences in public 
enforcement (PUBLICDIFF). All in all, the regulatory data overlap with the data on portfolio 
investments for 38 countries.
12  
 
A caveat should be mentioned here. The original data are mainly focused on regulations 
regarding initial public offerings, rather than the general system of securities regulations. 
However, since these data are the most comprehensive data systematically documenting 
securities regulations for a large number of countries that I have found, it is highly likely that 
regulatory differences in this dimension will also be crude measures of the general differences 
in securities regulations.   
 
                                                 
12 The countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom. United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.   10
Added to the above measures of regulatory differences, data from the highly influential “Law 
and Finance” paper by La Porta et al. (1998) on the protection of shareholders and creditors 
are used to construct three further indices of regulatory differences. The first of these uses all 
sub-indices to construct a “law-and-finance” difference index (LAWFINDIFF), the second 
uses differences in shareholder protection (SHAREPROTDIFF), and the third differences in 
creditor protection (CREDITORDIFF). These indices are constructed using the same 
methodology as above and will be used to check the robustness of the main results.  
 
As instruments for differences in regulatory frameworks, I will follow much of the literature 
on finance and growth and use differences in legal origins from La Porta et al. (1998), and a 
dummy of shared colonial history from Rose (2002).  
 
4.3. Other bilateral variables 
 
Data on bilateral trade flows are from the year 1999 and are taken from Rose (2002). These 
data are originally from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. The value of bilateral trade is 
the average of exports and imports from i to j and from j to i. Exports are FOB and imports 
are CIF. Since I am not interested in the coefficient of the trade variable per se, and trade 
flows are quite constant over time, the two-year discrepancy between the asset holding data 
and the trade data is of no major importance. Further, as opposed to the asset data, trade is a 
flow variable. Hence, it is not clear exactly which year should be used and empirically, the 
choice is of minor importance.
13 From Rose (2002), I also get data on common language, 
common border, free trade agreements, and the distance between each country-pair. Data on 
religious beliefs are from Alesina et al. (2003), and data on cultural values are from Hofstede 
(2001). 
 
4.4. Country-specific data 
 
For some regressions, data for each individual country are needed. In addition to the variables 
mentioned above, I use an index of judicial efficiency from the International Country Risk 
Guide, an index of government effectiveness from Kaufman et al. (2003), the ratio of stock 
market trading to GDP from Beck et al. (2000), the ratio of small shareholders’ stock market 
                                                 
13 Using the average value of trade between 1997 and 1999 has a miniscule (third decimal) effect on the 
estimates of the various indices of regulatory differences.   11
capitalization from La Porta et al. (2003), a dummy for membership in the EU (constructed by 
the author), and dummies for legal origins from La Porta et al. (1998). Data on land area, 
population, GDP and GDP per capita are from the World Bank World Development 




5.1. Main results 
 
The main results are displayed in Table 3. The dependent variable is the logarithm of portfolio 
holdings in country j by residents in country i. The first column shows the OLS-estimate of 
the dependent variable on the most comprehensive measure of differences in securities 
regulations, SECREGDIFF. The variable is highly statistically significant and negative, as 
expected. The coefficient of .05 implies that two countries moving their securities regulations 
one standard deviation “closer” to each other will experience a .13 log-point, or exp(.13)-1 ≈ 
14 percent, increase in their foreign ownership of portfolio assets.  
 
As mentioned, the OLS-estimate is likely to be biased both because of reverse causality (that 
could yield both an upward and downward bias in the OLS-coefficients) and measurement 
error (that would cause a bias towards zero). In column two, two-stage-least-squares estimates 
are employed to remedy these problems. The instruments for differences in securities 
regulations are a dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of common colonial 
history. The F-statistics (38.5) of the instruments from the first-stage regression show to be 
very strong, and a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions shows that they are valid to use 
as instruments (p-value 0.34).
14 Now, the point estimate drops  to -0.25, implying an increase 
in asset holdings from a one standard deviation decrease in differences in securities 
regulations by 88 percent! While this effect is very large (almost implausibly large), it should 
be kept in mind that the indicator of differences in securities regulation is very crude. The 
result is therefore not to be viewed as a precise estimate of the impact of regulatory 
differences. Rather, it is indicative of the importance of these differences. 
                                                 
14 It is possible to argue that that the dummy for shared colonial history should be included as a RHS-variable in 
its own right. When this is done, and legal origin is used as the only instrument, the colonial dummy is not 
statistically significant (p-value .4). The standard error on SECREGDIFF is somewhat increased but the point 
estimate is stable and still statistically significant (p-value .03). This, together with the OID-tests, suggests that 
colonial history is a valid instrument for regulatory differences.   12
 
Since the purpose of this study is mainly to unravel the causal effect of differences in 
securities regulation on asset holdings, I postpone the problem of disentangling whether the 
difference in point estimates between the OLS and 2SLS estimates is due to measurement 
error or negative reverse causality to Section 5.7.
15 
  
The empirical specification does a very good job in explaining bilateral portfolio holdings. 
The R-squared is around .86 and most of the explanatory variables have the expected signs. 
Countries remote from each other, both geographically and economically, have smaller asset 
holdings. Bilateral trade volumes are strongly positively related to portfolio trade. Countries 
sharing a common language invest more in each other’s markets, as do, in general, countries 
belonging to the same free-trade areas. There are two oddities, however. First of all, the 
common land border dummy has a negative sign, as does the dummy for NAFTA-
membership. Regarding the border dummy, this seems to be due to the inclusion of both 
bilateral trade and distance in the regressions. Dropping these two variables from the 
regression makes the border-variable take on a positive sign. The NAFTA-dummy remains 
negative, though, and there seems to be no other explanation than that the NAFTA-members 




In columns three to eight, the results are presented using the various sub-indices of differences 
in securities regulations described above. The first of these is based on the differences in 
disclosure regulations, the second on differences in private enforcement of securities 
regulation, and the third on differences in public enforcement of securities regulation. All of 
these are highly statistically significant and carry the expected negative sign. Considering the 
OLS-estimates, the implied size of the effect of harmonized securities regulations is relatively 
constant across these specifications. The 2SLS-estimates are more volatile and even larger 
than the estimate using the aggregate difference index.  
 
5.2. Another look at the size of the effects 
 
                                                 
15 As mentioned before, the possibility of a negative causal effect for protectionist reasons has been discussed by 
Rajan and Zingales (2003).   13
The results in the previous section imply that policy makers in a country can choose to 
increase the asset holdings of foreigners from a certain country by harmonizing the structure 
of securities regulations with this country. In practice, this is difficult to accomplish without 
improving or worsening the overall quality of the regulatory framework. In order to 
investigate how the quality and structure of securities regulation are related, I now include the 
country-specific indices of regulatory quality in the regressions. To achieve this, the country-
fixed effects must be dropped from the specifications and a set of control variables for both 
the source and destination countries be added.
16 It should be noted that I do not use exactly 
the same scaling of the regulatory indices as La Porta et al. (2003). To make their scale 
comparable to the indices of regulatory differences, I just add the different sub-components of 
the respective index. Using the original indices yields virtually identical results. Because of 
the problems related to the OLS-estimates, I only run these regressions using 2SLS and add 
dummies of legal origins for both source and destination to the set of instruments. To 
facilitate comparisons of the effects, I also run all regressions using a log-log specification 
where the regulatory indices are converted by taking the logarithm of (one plus) the original 




Although the indices of regulatory quality in both the source and destination country are 
positive, only the destination country’s regulatory quality is robustly significant. The 
interpretation of this result is that the improvement of domestic securities regulation will 
attract more foreign portfolio investments.
17 The size of the coefficient on SECREG suggests 
that an increase in this index by one standard deviation (3.77 points) will increase foreign 
portfolio holdings by about 40 percent. Such a change would, on the other hand, also lead to a 
change in the difference index, SECREGDIFF. The total effect on foreign asset holdings thus 
depends on how SECREGDIFF is affected on average. A country that simultaneously moves 
its securities regulations by 3.77 points towards all other countries’ regulatory framework 
would experience another 150 percent increase in foreign asset holdings. It is, however, 
                                                 
16 Given that the fixed effects capture all country-specific factors, there is virtually no end to the variables that 
could potentially be added to the regressions. For both the source and destination country, I add the log of per 
capita GDP, external market capitalization, an index of judicial efficiency, an index of government effectiveness, 
the value traded in the stock market to GDP ratio, a dummy variable for EU membership, and the log of 
population size. In addition, the log of the product of source and destination country land area and GDP are 
included. I chose this set of controls since it brings the estimates close to those using fixed effects. 
17 This is consistent with the findings in Alfaro et al. (2003). They document that broad measures of institutional 
quality are strongly positively related to capital inflows.   14
possible to construct a scenario where the improvement of domestic regulation actually makes 
foreign investors more reluctant to hold securities in a certain country. Panel B of the table 
carries the same message, although its coefficients can be read as elasticities. A one percent 
increase in SECREGDIFF reduces the foreign asset holdings by almost two percent, while a 
one-percent increase in SECREG increases foreign asset holdings by about one percent. The 
pattern that a one-percent change in the difference-index yields about twice as large an effect 
as a one-percent change in the original index holds for all four indices of securities regulation. 
 
Given that the objective of policy makers is to increase global asset market integration, the 
relative size of these effects is a strong call for internationally coordinated policy making – 
even if this contributes to reducing regulatory standards in some countries. Naturally, policy 
coordination is better at a higher level than at a lower level of quality, but if a trade-off is 
necessary, coordination might be preferred. Although these results are quite straightforward, it 
should be clear that this study has nothing to say concerning the long-term, potentially 
detrimental, learning effects of reducing the number of ways in which securities markets are 
regulated.  
 
5.3. Rich and poor countries 
 
It is plausible that differences in securities regulation have different impacts at different levels 
of economic development. In this section, the sample of countries is split in several ways 
according to the median value of per capita GDP in order to address this issue. In column (1) 
of Table 5, only countries with above the median per capital GDP are included, and in column 
(2), only countries below. While the original results hold for the sample of relatively rich 
countries, there is no indication that differences in securities regulation affect asset holdings 
among poor countries. In other words, it could be the case that the importance of regulatory 
differences only begins to matter after some fundamental level of economic and regulatory 




In column (3), all source countries are included, but only the destination countries with a 
relatively high per capital GDP. Once more, the original results hold. In column (4), all source 
countries are once again included, but only low income destinations. The point estimate on   15
SECREGDIFF is again similar to the original ones, but it is now only statistically significant 
at the 10-percent level. In column (5), all destination countries are included, but only high-
income source countries. The point estimate is smaller, but still significant, both in the 
economic and statistical sense. Column (6) includes all destinations, but only low income 
source countries. The effect is now marginally statistically significant, but the point estimate 
is about the same as the original one. Taken together, these results indicate that while 
investors from both rich and poor countries are influenced by the differences in securities 
regulation, rich-country investors seem to be more sensitive in this dimension.  
 
5.4. The difference between equity and long-term debt holdings 
 
So far, the total level of bilateral securities assets has been used as the dependent variable. It 
is, however, possible that the differences in securities regulations have different effects on 
various types of asset holdings. Indeed, since the regulatory indices are mainly based on rules 
governing the issuance of new shares, they would be expected to have a stronger impact on 
equity than on debt holdings (especially since debt holdings include government bonds). For 
this reason, Table 6 presents the results from regressing equity holdings and long-term debt 
holdings by country i in country j, respectively, on the four different indices of differences in 




Although all coefficients on the indices of regulatory difference are consistently negative, it is 
obvious from Table 6 that the impact of regulatory differences is greater on bilateral equity 
holdings than on long-term debt holdings, just as expected. This is highly indicative of the 
indices capturing the regulatory effects they are meant to, rather than the effect of some 
omitted relationships between country-pairs. In fact, Table 6 provides further evidence for this 
view. The tests for over-identifying restrictions show that while differences in legal origin and 
colonial history (the instruments) are not correlated with the error terms in the equity 
regressions, they are so in the debt regressions. This suggests that debt issues (which include 
government debt), to a significant extent are placed in countries with which the issuing 
country has a shared history. On the other hand, no such independent effect of shared history 
can be found for equity holdings. 
   16
The next section presents some further evidence of the view that differences in the regulation 
of debt markets and equity markets have asymmetric effects on bilateral debt and equity 
holdings.  
 
5.5. Differences in investor protection  
 
As mentioned in Section 4, we should keep in mind that the indices of differences in securities 
regulation are based on data focusing on the regulation of initial public offerings, rather than 
securities regulation in general. To partly remedy this problem and to verify the robustness of 
the results, three difference indices based on the data on shareholder and creditor protection 
from the “Law and Finance” paper by La Porta et al. (1998) are used. The most 
comprehensive index LAWFINDIFF, is based on all sub-components in the original data. 
SHAREPROTDIFF is based on the differences in shareholder protection, and 
CREDITORDIFF is based on the differences in creditor protection. Table 7 presents the 
results from regressing total bilateral asset holdings, equity holdings, and long-term debt 




The first three columns show that the most comprehensive index of differences in investor 
protection has a similar effect on bilateral asset holdings as differences in securities regulation 
(column 1). The main difference is that the effect is almost symmetric for equity holdings 
(column 2) and long-term debt holdings (column 3).  
 
Differences in the protection of shareholders also have a strong impact on bilateral asset 
holdings (column 4), but the effect of this variable is, not surprisingly, stronger for equity 
holdings (column 5) than for long-term debt (column 6). The effect of differences in creditor 
protection is less statistically significant, but the point estimates are consistently negative. 
Although the difference is not large, there is some indication that differences in creditor 
protection are of greater importance for debt than for equity holdings.  
 
The results in Table 7 seem to suggest that differences in the regulation of equity markets 
limit bilateral equity holdings, while differences in the regulation of debt markets limit   17
bilateral debt holdings. Although this is undoubtedly both intuitive and appealing, the 
crudeness of the data renders the evidence on these issues mainly indicative.  
 
5.6. Further robustness 
 
In this section, a further set of robustness tests are performed. Although the main results are 
stable to the tests, it is found that differences in general institutional quality and in religious 




5.6.1. Excluding the hubs of international finance and trade  
 
First of all, the United States and the United Kingdom are very much the hubs around which 
the international financial system revolves. For this reason, it is possible that observations 
including these countries have a disproportionate effect on the results. In column 1 of Table 8, 
I therefore run the baseline specification excluding the US and the UK. As can be seen, the 
results are basically unaffected by this exclusion. I then exclude Singapore and Hong Kong 
(column 2) since these economies are exceptionally open to international trade and finance. 
Once again, the results do not change substantially. 
 
5.6.2. Differences in institutional quality 
 
Another possibility is that the indices of regulatory differences pick up effects from 
differences in general institutional quality, rather than from the regulatory structure per se. I 
therefore calculate the (absolute) difference in each of some commonly used indicators of 
institutional quality for each country-pair. The indicators are the Rule of Law Index from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the index of Government Effectiveness from 
Kaufmann et al (2003). As can be seen in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, the basic results do 
not change substantially because of these inclusions. This is a strong indication that the index 
of differences in securities regulation does not just serve as a proxy for general institutional   18
quality differences.
18 Even though not the focus of the present paper, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that differences in rule of law take on negative and statistically significant 
values (as do differences in corruption and the risk of expropriation). This suggests that 
investors prefer to invest in countries with similar levels of institutional quality as their home 
country. 
 
5.6.3. Differences in culture 
 
Next, the possibility that the differences in regulation mainly proxy for cultural differences is 
controlled for. This is first done by constructing an index of differences in religious beliefs 
between country-pairs. Looking at differences in religion is attractive, since the definitions of 
religious groupings are relatively constant across countries. The index is derived by summing 
over the squared differences in the share of the population belonging to a certain religious 
group. Algebraically, 
 
Religious Differenceij = ∑(Shareri - Sharerj)
2, r = 1, … m, 
 
where m is the number of religious groups and Shareri the share of the population in country i 
belonging to religion r.
19 This index is increasing in the differences in beliefs between 
countries. The underlying data for religious beliefs are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). The 
results from including this variable are shown in column (5) of Table 8. The point estimate is 
negative (as expected) and highly statistically significant. The point estimate of 
SECREGDIFF is somewhat reduced, but it remains highly significant, both in the economic 
and statistical sense. Once again, an interesting secondary result is discovered, but I leave it to 
future research to further investigate the link between religious differences and international 
investments.  
 
A second measure of cultural differences is calculated using the work of the cultural 
anthropologist Hofstede (2001). He used personnel data on IBM employees around the world 
to classify national cultures along four dimensions: power distance (the acceptance of an 
                                                 
18 I have also used the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, and the Risk of 
Expropriation Index from ICRG with very similar results. Entering all four institutional indicators 
simultaneously does not change the results. These results are available upon request. 
19 The following religious groupings are used: Buddhist, Catholic Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Non 
religious, Other Christians, Orthodox Christian, Protestant Christian, Shinto. Muslims are not divided into 
Shiites and Sunnis since there is not a significant share of Shiites in this sample of countries.    19
unequal distribution power in an organization), the degree of individualism, uncertainty 
avoidance (related to risk aversion), and masculinity (related to gender inequality).
20 Each of 
these dimensions was assigned a score between 0-100 for each country. An index is then 
constructed by summing the absolute value of differences between country pairs for each of 
the cultural dimensions. Algebraically, 
 
Cultural Differenceij = ∑|Culture Dimensionci – Culture Dimensioncj|, c = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
 
where Culture Dimensionci is the value of dimension c in country i. In column (6) of Table 8, 
it can be seen that this variable takes on a negative coefficient but the statistical significance is 
just below the conventional levels. The results for the index on differences in securities 
regulation are once again unaffected.  
 
Finally, in column (7), all four new variables (differences in rule of law, government 
effectiveness, religious beliefs, and cultural values) are included. The basic results also hold 
up for this exercise.  
 
5.7. The direction of causality revisited 
 
As mentioned in Sections 3 and 5.1, the increase in coefficient size when running 2SLS 
regressions rather than OLS regressions can be explained in two different ways. First, the 
2SLS estimator could be solving a measurement error problem in the explanatory variable that 
causes the OLS estimates to be biased towards zero. Second, the reverse causality could 
actually be negative, thereby implying that countries attempt to differentiate their regulatory 
systems from their main trading partners. In this section, I will present some crude attempts at 
discriminating between these hypotheses, and find support for the latter. This offers support 
for the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis that the regulation of financial markets is 
sometimes used to protect domestic capital markets from outside competition. 
 
To investigate the sign of the reverse causality, I first let bilateral portfolio holdings and 
differences in securities regulation switch places in the regression, thereby letting differences 
in securities regulation be explained by portfolio holdings rather than the other way around. In 
                                                 
20 It is impossible to here give full credit to the strengths and weaknesses of Hofstede’s approach. The interested 
reader should start by consulting Hofstede (2001) and the references therein.    20
addition, the following explanatory variables are included: differences in legal origin and 
common colonial past (the instruments from the previous 2SLS regressions), the common 
border dummy, geographic distance, the common language dummy, differences in per capita 
GDP, the value of bilateral trade, dummies for various regional trading arrangements, and 




The OLS estimates from this regression are presented in column 1 of Table 9. Naturally, the 
partial correlation between differences in securities regulation and bilateral asset holdings is 
negative. Differences in legal origin are associated with larger differences in the regulatory 
framework, and common colonial past with smaller differences (which of course is why these 
variables work as instruments), a larger geographical distance is associated with larger 
regulatory differences, while sharing a common border dummy seems to increase these 
differences. The common language dummy is associated with smaller differences, while 
differences in per capita GDP are not statistically significant. Trade volumes are negatively 
related to regulatory differences, but only with marginal statistical significance. The free-trade 
area dummies take on both negative and positive signs. 
 
While these results are all interesting, the causal effect remains to be established. For this 
purpose, I instrument bilateral asset holdings with the product of (the log of) population size, 
the product of (the log of) GDP, and the absolute value of differences in the rule of law 
index.
21 Population size and GDP are likely to be positively related to the level of bilateral 
asset holdings, but there is no reason to expect them to have an effect on differences in the 
regulatory framework.
22 Using the difference in the rule of law index as an instrument is more 
questionable, but we know from Table 8 that this variable is an important determinant of 
bilateral asset holdings. At the same time, it is basically uncorrelated with differences in 
securities regulation.
23 Hence, the instrumented coefficient on bilateral asset holdings tells us 
how the exogenous component of asset holdings is associated with the regulatory framework. 
                                                 
21 This is equivalent to estimating the second equation of a system using a three-stage least squares procedure, 
while forcing the covariance matrix of equation disturbances to be diagonal. One equation in the system is the 
2SLS estimation with ln(1+PORTINV) as the dependent variable, and the other is the 2SLS estimation with 
SECREGDIFF as the dependent variable. Performing a full 3SLS, also using the parameter variance between the 
equations has no important effect on the results (the standard errors become marginally smaller). 
22 Including these two variables in the baseline regressions does not affect the results to any significant degree. 
23 The correlation coefficient is -0.03 and is not statistically significant.   21
Column 2 of Table 9 shows this effect to be positive and statistically significant at the five-
percent level. The F-test (test statistics 9.78) indicates that the instruments have reasonable 
explanatory power and the test of over-identifying restrictions tells us that the instruments are 
valid (p-value 0.31).  
 
This is a strong indication that while there is indeed an endogeneity problem in the OLS 
regression of bilateral asset holdings on differences in securities regulation, this endogeneity 
problem causes an upward  (towards zero) bias in the OLS estimates. A less statistical 
interpretation is that regulatory authorities are inclined to construct regulatory frameworks 




Data on securities regulation and investor protection presented in La Porta et al. (1998, 2003) 
are used in a novel way to calculate indices of bilateral differences in regulatory policies. 
Combining these indices with data on bilateral asset holdings, it is found that the 
harmonization of securities regulation can potentially have very large effects on the 
integration of securities markets. It is verified that these effects do not only reflect general 
differences in economic development, institutional quality, and cultural values. This said, both 
differences in institutional quality and religious beliefs tend to decrease bilateral asset 
holdings. When investigating causality, it is found that the exogenous component of bilateral 
asset holdings appears to be associated with larger differences in securities regulation. This 
offers support for the idea presented by Rajan and Zingales (2003) that financial regulation 
can be used to protect domestic capital markets from outside competition.  
 
This is by no means the final word on the consequences (and causes) of harmonized securities 
regulation. First of all, there are several ways of measuring capital market integration, and 
using other measures than aggregate asset holdings can yield further insights into the 
mechanisms at work. Second, due to the crudeness of the regulatory data, the present paper 
must take the view that all regulatory differences are equal. This is most likely not true, so 
another priority for future research is constructing more detailed measures on various aspects 
of regulatory differences. Further, the ideal data for investigating these questions would also 
include the time dimension. Time-varying measures of bilateral asset holdings (or flows) and 
regulatory changes could then be used to better establish the size of the causal effect than   22
what is possible using the present instrumental variables approach. Another interesting area of 
research would be to focus on a single industry, like the banking sector. This way, the task of 
constructing more detailed, and possibly time-varying, measures of regulatory differences 
could prove less daunting.  
 
It should be clear that a number of important issues are not being addressed here. It could for 
example, be the case that regulatory harmonization has positive – or negative – effects on 
domestic financial development.
24 More generally, this study teaches us little about the long-
term effects of harmonization. To some extent, the existence of different regulatory systems 
provides lessons regarding the effectiveness of various regulatory tools. Hence, long-term 
regulatory development can be impeded if harmonization is taken too far.
25 This study is also 
silent on what the optimal level of harmonization is, what regulatory powers should be left for 
national authorities, what should be in the hands of supra-national authorities, should 
harmonization be created by minimum or maximum standards, and so on.  
 
A further investigation of the results for institutional and religious differences is also 
warranted. The results here indicate that differences along both these dimensions influence the 
choice of country in which to invest. Although these results appear very strong, it remains to 
be seen how they stand up to closer scrutiny. 
 
Although the findings in this paper are important in their own right, it could be that the main 
contribution is methodological. By exploiting the growing number of datasets on various 
aspects of bilateral linkages, there is ample scope for studying the interactions between 
institutions and markets in ways not possible using standard cross-country data. The method 
displays some similarities to that used by Fisman and Love (2004). They study how 
differences in economic and financial development affect the correlation of industry growth 
rates between countries. The fact that their line of inquiry is very different from the one here 
should only highlight the potential of the approach. 
                                                 
24 It is, for example, possible that the optimal regulatory framework in an economy with dispersed stock 
ownership (like the US) is different than in an economy with concentrated ownership (like most of Europe). For 
a discussion of the different possible impacts the same takeover legislation can have in heterogeneous 
economies, see Berglöf and Burkhart (2003). 
25 The new Germany bankruptcy law provides an illustrative example. It was recently updated and it now 
provides the option of Chapter 11-type restructuring. Had the US experience with Chapter 11 not existed because 
of harmonization, it is not certain that the German authorities would have come up with this idea.   23
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Appendix. Constructing indices of regulatory differences 
 
For each country-pair ij, a set of indices of regulatory differences is constructed using the following 
methodology: Regulatory differenceij = Σ |REGt,i – REGt,j| , t = 1, …, n, where t is the individual sub-index 
presented below. 
 
Table A1. Sub-indices from “What works in Securities Laws?”, La Porta et al. (2003). 
Sub-index Description  Used  for 
    
Prospectus  Equals one if the law prohibits selling securities that are going to be listed on the largest stock 




Sharehol  An index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s equity ownership structure. Equals one if 
the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder who, 
directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer’s voting securities; equals one-half if 
reporting requirements for the´ Issuer’s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only 
their aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing 
the name and ownership stake of the Issuer’s 10% shareholders. No distinction is drawn between 





Compensa  An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of directors and key 
officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each director and 
key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the aggregate 
compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; 
equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in 




Insideow  An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of the Issuer’s shares 
by its directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the ownership of 
the Issuer’s shares by each of its director and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-
half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers must 
be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer’s shares by its directors and 




Contract  An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s contracts outside the ordinary 
course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of material 
contracts made by the Issuer  outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the 
prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary 




Transact  An index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transaction between the Issuer and its 
directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”). Equals one if the law or the 
listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be 
disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related 
parties must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related 





Bdn_dire  Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Issuer’s directors in a civil liability 
case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only 
required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when 
investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the 
misleading statement. Equals one-third when investors prove that the director acted with negligence 
and that they either relied on the prospectus or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement 





Bdn_dist  Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Distributor in a civil liability case for 
losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to 
prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when investors must 
also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading 
statement. Equals one-third when investors prove that the Distributor acted with negligence and that 
they either relied on the prospectus or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement or both. 





Bdn_acco  Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the Accountant in a civil liability case for 
losses due to misleading statements in the audited financial information accompanying the 
prospectus. Equals one when investors are only required to prove that the audited financial 
information accompanying the prospectus contains a misleading statement. Equals two-thirds when 
investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the 
misleading accounting information. Equals one-third when investors prove that the Accountant acted 
with negligence and that they either relied on the prospectus or that their loss was caused by the 
misleading statement or both. Equals zero if restitution from the Accountant is unavailable or the 




Appoint  Equals one if a majority of the members of the Supervisor are unilaterally appointed by the Executive 
branch of government; equals zero otherwise. 
SECREG; 
PUBLIC   27
Tenure  Equals one if members of the Supervisor cannot be dismissed at the will of the appointing authority; 
equals zero otherwise. 
SECREG; 
PUBLIC 
Focus  Equals one if separate government agencies or official authorities are in charge of supervising 




Rules  Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing 
rules on stock exchanges without prior approval of other governmental authorities. Equals one-half if 
the Supervisor can generally issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on 





Document  An index of the power of the Supervisor to command documents when investigating a violation of 
securities laws. Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order commanding 
all persons to turn over documents; equals one-half if the Supervisor  can generally issue an 
administrative order commanding publicly traded corporations and/or their directors to turn over 




Witness  An index of the power of the Supervisor to subpoena the testimony of witnesses when investigating a 
violation of securities laws. Equals one if the Supervisor can generally subpoena all persons to give 
testimony; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally subpoena the directors of publicly-traded 




Ord_iss  An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed at the Issuer in case of a defective 
prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-
index of orders to stop equals 
one if the Issuer may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Issuer 
may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to 
do equals one if the Issuer may be ordered to perform a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; 
equals one-half if the Issuer may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. 




Ord_dis  An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed at the Distributor in case of a defective 
prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-
index of orders to stop equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of 
actions; equals one-half if the Distributor may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals 
zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to perform 
a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Distributor may only be 
ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by 




Ord_acc  An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed at the Accountant in case of a defective 
prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-
index of orders to stop equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of 
actions; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals 
zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to perform 
a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be 
ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by 




Crim_dir  An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Issuer’s  directors and key officers when the 
prospectus omits material information. We create separate sub-indexes for directors and key officers 
and average their scores. The sub-index for directors equals zero when directors cannot be held 
criminally liable when the prospectus is misleading. Equals one-half if directors can be held 
criminally liable when aware that the prospectus is misleading. Equals one if directors can also be 
held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the prospectus is misleading. The sub-index for 




Crim_dis  An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Distributor (or its officers) when the prospectus 
omits material information. Equals zero if the Distributor cannot be held criminally liable when the 
prospectus is misleading. Equals one-half if the Distributor can be held criminally liable when aware 
that the prospectus is misleading. Equals one if the Distributor can also be held criminally liable 




Crim_acc  An index of criminal sanctions applicable to the Accountant  (or its officers) when the financial 
statements accompanying the prospectus omit material information. Equals zero if the Accountant 
cannot be held criminally liable when the financial statements accompanying the prospectus are 
misleading. Equals one-half if the Accountant can be held criminally liable when aware that the 
financial statement accompanying the prospectus are misleading. Equals one if the Accountant can 
also be held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the financial statements accompanying 
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Table A2. Sub-indices from “Law and Finance”, La Porta et al. (1998) 
Sub-index Description  Used  for 
    





Nshsbloc  Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows firms to require that shareholders 
deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting thus preventing them from seIling those 




Cumu_vot  Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to cast their votes for one 




Oppr_mi  Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders either a judicial 
venue to challenge the management decisions or the right to step out of the company by requiring the 
company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as merge, 




Esmvotes  The minimum percentage shares that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 




Preempt  Equals one when company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy 




Ch11_res  Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent to file for 
reorganization. It equals O if there are no such restrictions. 
LAWFIN; 
CREDITOR 
Nauto_st  Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes an automatic stay on the assets of the firm upon 
filing the organization petition. This restriction prevents secured creditors to gain possession of their 




st  Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the 
Government and workers, are given absolute priority. 
LAWFIN; 
CREDITOR 
Mgt_nst  Equals one if the debtor keeps the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization process, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, this variable equals zero when an official 
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Table 1a. Summary Statistics – Bilateral variables 
Subscript i refers to the source country, and j to the destination country. CPIS is the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey, end of 2001. LLS is La Porta et al. (2003). LLSV is La Porta et al. (1998). Rose is Rose 
(2002). KKM is Kaufaman et al. (2003). ADEKW is Alesina et al. (2003). WDI is the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. Hofstede is Hofstede (2001). Author is the author’s own coding. 
Variable Description  Source  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
          
PORTINV  Total portfolio holdings by i in j. CPIS  1249  7781.757  29645.5 
EQUITY Equity  holdings  by  I in j. CPIS  1139  3822.6  16551.93 
LTD  Long-term debt holdings by i in 
j. 
CPIS 1152 4178.188  15713.1 
STD Short-term  debt  holdings  I in j. CPIS  970  569.238  3860.103 
SECREGDIFF  Differences in total securities 
regulation. 
LLS 1249  7.7865  2.4983 
DISCLOSEDIFF Differences  in  disclosure 
regulation. 
LLS 1249  1.9047  0.971 
PRIVATEDIFF Differences  in the regulation of 
private enforcement. 
LLS 1249  2.925  1.281 
PUBLICDIFF Differences  in the regulation of 
public enforcement. 
LLS 1249  4.861  1.962 
























TRADE Bilateral  trade  between  i and j in 
US dollars. 
Rose 1249 2.19E+07  6.51E+07 
GDPPCDIFF  Absolute value of differences in 
per capita GDP between i and j 







DIST Distance  between  I and j.  Rose 1249 4783.427  3115.626 
BORDER  Dummy for common border.  Rose  1249  0.056  0.2301 
COMLANG  Dummy for common language.  Rose  1249  0.1985  0.399 
EU  Dummy for mutual EU 
membership. 
Author 1249  0.1665  0.3727 
USI  Dummy for mutual membership 
in the US-Israel FTA. 
Rose 1249 0.0016  0.04 
NAFTA  Dummy for mutual NAFTA 
membership. 
Rose 1249 0.0016  0.04 
ANZERTA  Dummy for mutual membership 
in ANZERTA. 
Rose 1249 0.0016  0.04 
MERCOSUR  Dummy for mutual membership 
in MERCOSUR. 
Rose 1249 0.0096  0.0975 
ASEAN  Dummy for mutual membership 
in ASEAN. 
Rose 1249 0.014 0.119 
LEGDIFF  Dummy for different legal origin.  LLSV  1249  0.7181  0.45 
COLONY  Dummy for sharing a colonial 
past. 
Rose 1249 0.036 0.188 
RULELAWDIFF Absolute  value of differences in 
the Rule of law. 
LLSV 1249  2.584  2.004 
GOVEFFDIFF  Absolute value of differences in 
the Government effectiveness. 
KKM 1249  0.9496  0.6972 
RELIGIONDIFF  Index of differences in religious 
beliefs. 
ADEKW 1179  0.7753  0.534 
CULTUREDIFF  Index of differences in cultural 
values. 
Hofstede 1205  1.043  0.432 
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Table 1b. Summary statistics – Country-level variables  
LLS is La Porta et al. (2003). KKM is Kaufmann et al. (2003). BLL is Beck et al. (2000). WDI is the World 
Bank World Development Indicators. Author is the author’s own coding. 
Variable Description  Source  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
          
SECREG  Index of securities regulation.  LLS  38  9.961  3.978 
DISCLOSE  Index of disclosure regulation.  LLS  38  2.731  1.245 
PRIVATE 
 


















GDPPC  GDP per capita in US dollars.  WDI  38  16294  11167 
GDP  GDP in millions of US dollars.  WDI  38  737397  1725445 
EFF_JUD  Index of judicial efficiency.   LLS  38  7.942  2.186 
GOVEFF Index  of  government 
effectiveness. 
KKM 38  1.141  0.858 
TRADING  Stock market trading to GDP-
ratio. 
BLL 38  0.276 0.277 
EU  Dummy for EU membership.  Author  38  0.384  0.493 
MKTCAP 
 








POP  Population size in millions.  WDI  38  47.212  60.178 
AREA  Land area in square kilometers.  WDI  38  1297201  2572906 
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Table 2. Differences in securities regulation 
This table shows the country-pairs with differences in securities regulation in the lowest and highest percentiles, 
as well as at the median.  
Country 1  Country 2  SECREGDIFF 
    
Hong Kong  Malaysia  0.5 
Austria Germany  0.83 
United States  Philippines  2 
Hong Kong  Singapore  2.5 
Greece Spain  2.66 
Finland Greece  2.66 
   
Austria Uruguay  7.75 
New Zealand  Thailand  7.75 
France Thailand  7.75 
Indonesia Singapore  7.75 
Switzerland Thailand  7.75 
Italy Thailand  7.75 
   
United States  Germany  14 
United States  Austria  14.17 
Germany Singapore  14.48 
Austria Singapore  14.65 
United States  Belgium  14.68 
   32
Table 3. Main results 
The dependent variable is the log of 1+portfolio holdings by country i in country j. Source and destination 
country fixed effects are included. Standard errors, clustered on country-pair, appear beneath the point estimates. 
Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) levels indicated. Instruments in the 2SLS-estimates are a 
dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of common colonial history. F-test is the F-statistics of the 
instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports the p-value from a Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions.  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Est. method  OLS  2SLS OLS  2SLS OLS  2SLS OLS  2SLS 
           
SECREGDIFF  -0.0537  -0.2533         
  0.0196***  0.0856***         
DISCLOSEDIFF    -0.1576  -0.8672      
    0.0535***  0.3118***      
PRIVATEDIFF       -0.0861  -0.8946    
       0.0404**  0.3504***    
PUBLICDIFF         -0.0509  -0.3534 
         0.0239**  0.1248*** 
Ln(DIST)  -0.2962 -0.2545 -0.318  -0.3661 -0.316  -0.3971 -0.2916 -0.1982 
  0.128**  0.1314** 0.1274*** 0.1279***  0.1288***  0.1449***  0.1289** 0.1435 
Ln(GDPPCDIFF)  -0.3635 -0.3676 -0.3761  -0.4379 -0.3698 -0.4397 -0.359  -0.3391 
  0.0807*** 0.0797*** 0.08063*** 0.0886*** 0.0809*** 0.0968*** 0.0813*** 0.0832*** 
Ln(TRADE)  0.4797 0.3653 0.4619  0.2438 0.4733 0.125  0.5032 0.4603 
  0.081*** 0.0978***  0.0811*** 0.1322*  0.0813***  0.1812  0.0806***  0.0901*** 
COMLANG  0.5204 0.2366 0.509  0.1143 0.5261 -0.1376  0.566  0.3844 
  0.148*** 0.1972  0.1463*** 0.2368  0.1507***  0.3345  0.1457***  0.18** 
BORDER  -0.4774 -0.3131 -0.4774  -0.2784 -0.4993 -0.2906 -0.4928 -0.3219 
  0.21** 0.2376 0.2041**  0.2369 0.2066**  0.2639 0.2124**  0.2581 
EU  0.5943 0.5797 0.5214  0.1753 0.5792 0.3996 0.6058 0.6508 
  0.174*** 0.1902***  0.1775*** 0.2487  0.1753***  0.2404  0.1743***  0.2027*** 
USI  0.8086 0.1008 1.0681  1.3794 1.0149 1.1652 0.8088 -0.3195 
  0.272*** 0.4461  0.2702*** 0.3768***  0.2668***  0.4208***  0.2758***  0.5739 
NAFTA  -1.3419 -2.6812 -1.2184  -2.284  -1.2756 -4.0362 -1.1496 -2.1466 
  0.302*** 0.6775***  0.2734*** 0.5949***  0.2959***  1.2877***  0.2754***  0.5414*** 
ANZERTA  1.2978 2.2657 1.3307  2.6505 1.2432 3.1745 1.1628 1.9068 
  0.336*** 0.5507***  0.3445*** 0.6824***  0.3444***  0.9114***  0.3345***  0.5055*** 
MERCOSUR 1.5019 1.7862 1.4473  1.5455 1.4244 1.4143 1.4987 1.9331 
  0.576*** 0.6088***  0.5405*** 0.5373***  0.5618***  0.6409** 0.5864***  0.6686*** 
ASEAN  0.7055 0.4819 0.678  0.2838 0.7352 0.4489 0.7266 0.495 
  0.467  0.4678 0.474  0.5256 0.4696 0.5022 0.4695 0.4879 
           
Fixed  effects  YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.87 0.86 0.87  0.85 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.85 
#  OBS  1249 1249 1249  1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 
F-test      38.5   22.7   13.4   28.6 
OID  (p-value)    0.34   0.14   0.39   0.34 
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Table 4. Another look at the size of the effects (dropping FE) 
2SLS-estimates. The dependent variable is the log of 1+portfolio holdings by country i in country j. In column 
(1), the total index of securities regulation is used, in (2) the disclosure index, in (3) the private enforcement 
index, and in (4) the public enforcement index. Regulatory difference is the coefficient of the respective index of 
regulatory difference, destination regulation index is the coefficient of the capital importing country’s index of 
securities regulation, source regulation index is the coefficient of the capital exporting country’s index of 
securities regulation. In Panel A, the indices themselves are used, in Panel B log(1+index) are used. All 
regressions include the bilateral controls that appear in Table 3. In addition, the product of both countries’ GDP 
and  land area are included. Further, source and destination country per capita GDP, external market 
capitalization, an index of judicial efficiency, an index of government effectiveness, the value traded in the stock 
market to GDP ratio, a dummy variable for EU membership, and the log of population size. Standard errors, 
clustered on country-pair, appear beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) 
levels indicated. Instruments in the 2SLS-estimates are a dummy of differences in legal origin, a dummy of 
common colonial history, and dummies of legal origin for exporter and importer, respectively. F-test is the F-
statistics of the instruments from the first-stage regression for the difference index, the destination country’s 
index, and the source country’s index. OID reports the p-value from a Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions.  
Panel A: log-level  (1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) 
Est. method:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Index of regulation:  SECREG DISCLOSE  PRIVATE  PUBLIC 
      
Regulatory difference  -0.3232 -0.6741 -0.6446 -0.472 
index   0.1002*** 0.3078**  0.2534*** 0.1446*** 
Destination regulation   0.0837 0.1104 0.1171 0.1291 
index  0.027*** 0.087  0.0673*  0.0413*** 
Source regulation   0.0478 -0.0753 -0.0229  0.0895 
index  0.0283* 0.0852  0.0669  0.0423** 
      
R2  0.77 0.78 0.77 0.75 
# OBS  1249 1249 1249 1249 
F-test (diff. index)  14.4 6.6  6.2  10.2 
F-test (destination index)  173.3 107.6 78.1  121.6 
F-test (source index)  182.2 123.39  84.4  124.1 
OID (p-value)   0.29 0.3  0.42 0.21 
      
Panel B: log-log  (1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) 
Est. method:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Index of regulation:  SECREG DISCLOSE  PRIVATE  PUBLIC 
      
Log of Regulatory  -2.425 -1.828 -2.0653  -2.6884 
difference index   0.818*** 0.868**  0.8769***  0.8594*** 
Log of Destination   0.8548 0.4107 0.5727 0.7769 
regulation index  0.2844*** 0.3167  0.3069**  0.2578*** 
Log of Source   0.4698 -0.323  -0.1621  0.5476 
regulation index  0.2897 0.3102 0.2987 0.2635** 
      
R2  0.77 0.78 0.78 0.73 
# OBS  1249 1249 1249 1249 
F-test (diff. index)  16.4 6.6  7.8  10.9 
F-test (destination index)  222.3 61.9  58.2  115.1 
F-test (source index)  232.3 69.9  62.1  116.3 
OID (p-value)  0.26 0.34 0.33 0.23 
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Table 5. Rich vs. poor countries 
2SLS-estimates. The dependent variable is the log of 1+portfolio holdings by country i in country j. In column 
(1), only rich countries (above median per capita GDP) are included, in (2), only poor countries (below median 
per capita GDP) are included. In (3), rich destination (country j) and all sources (country i) are included. In (4), 
poor j-countries and all i-countries are included. In (5), all j-countries and rich i-countries are included. In (6), all 
j-countries and poor i-countries are included. All regressions include the bilateral controls that appear in Table 3. 
Source and destination country fixed effects are included. Standard errors, clustered on country-pair, appear 
beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) levels indicated. Instruments are a 
dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of common colonial history. F-test is the F-statistics of the 
instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports the p-value from a Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Est. method:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Sample:  R (dest)  P (dest)  R (dest)  P (dest)  All (dest)  All (dest) 
  R (source)  P (source)  All (source)  All (source)  R (source)  P (source) 
        
SECREGDIFF  -0.2118 -0.0777 -0.2578 -0.2063 -0.1618 -0.2269 
 0.1008**  0.1859  0.0957***  0.1279*  0.079**  0.1242* 
        
Fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
R2  0.81 0.74 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.78 
#  OBS  303 261 633 616 658 591 
F-test  12.4 10.3 19.3 18.9 19.6 19.8 
OID  (p-value)  0.2  0.08 0.52 0.13 0.36 0.01 
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Table 6. Equity and long-term debt holdings 
2SLS-estimates. The dependent variables are the log of 1+equity holdings or 1+long-term debt holdings by 
country i in country j. In columns (1) and (2), the total index of securities regulation is used, in (3) and (4) the 
disclosure index, in (5) and (6) the private enforcement index, and in (7) and (8) the public enforcement index. 
Regulatory difference index is the coefficient of the respective index of regulatory difference. All regressions 
include the bilateral controls that appear in Table 3. Source and destination country fixed effects are included. 
Standard errors, clustered on country-pair, appear beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), 
and 10 percent (*) levels indicated. Instruments are a dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of 
common colonial history. F-test is the F-statistics of the instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports 
the p-value from a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Est. method  2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent 
variable 
Equity LT  debt  Equity LT  debt  Equity  LT debt  Equity  LT debt 
            
SECREGDIFF    -0.2381  -0.133         
  0.0784***  0.0756*         
DISCLOSEDIFF     -0.8556  -0.4544      
     0.3062***  0.2885      
PRIVATEDIFF        -0.8334  -0.5655    
        0.3289***  0.3073*    
PUBLICDIFF          -0.3332  -0.1715 
          0.1137***  0.1041* 
            
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
            
R2  0.87 0.86  0.86 0.87  0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 
#  OBS  1135 1152  1135 1152  1135 1152 1135 1152 
F-test  36.5 36.3  20.3 18.9  12.9 10.9 26.9 28.7 
OID  (p-value)  0.74 0.01  0.48 0.01  0.82 0.05 0.69 0.01 
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Table 7. Differences in investor protection 
2SLS-estimates. The dependent variables are the log of 1+portfolio holdings, 1+equity holdings or 1+long-term debt holdings by country i in country j. In columns (1), (2) 
and (3), LAWFINDIFF from La Porta et al. (1998) is used as the index of regulatory differences, in (4), (5) and (6), the difference in shareholder protection is used as the 
index of regulatory differences, in (7), (8) and (9), the difference in creditor protection is used as the index of regulatory differences. Regulatory difference index is the 
coefficient of the respective index of regulatory difference. All regressions include the bilateral controls that appear in Table 3. Source and destination country fixed effects 
are included. Standard errors, clustered on country-pair, appear beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) levels indicated. Instruments are 
a dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of common colonial history. F-test is the F-statistics of the instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports the p-
value from a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Est. method  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable  Portinv Equity LT  debt  Portinv Equity  LT  debt  Portinv  Equity  LT  debt 
                 
LAWFINDIFF  -0.6872  -0.4931  -0.528           
  0.2655***  0.216**  0.2158***           
SHAREPROTDIFF        -0.9429  -0.9599 -0.6272      
        0.3862***  0.392***  0.3162**     
CREDITORDIFF              -1.7568 -1.0898 -1.2392 
             1.0712*  0.7032  0.7525* 
                 
                 
Fixed  effects  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
                 
R2  0.82 0.86  0.84 0.82 0.83  0.85  0.67  0.81  0.78 
#  OBS  1159 1072  1072 1198 1102  1106  1209  1105  1117 
F-test  12.5 14.7  12.5 12.2 10.5  11.8  4.6  5.7  5.2 
OID  (p-value) 0.43 0.05  0.52 0.96 0.41  0.14  0.45  0.06  0.83 
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Table 8. Country exclusions and differences in institutions and culture 
2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of 1+portfolio holdings by country i in country j. In column 
(1), the US and UK are excluded from the sample. In (2), Singapore and Hong Kong are excluded. In column 
(3), the absolute difference in the Rule of law index, in (4), the absolute difference in the Government 
Effectiveness index, in (5), the index of differences in religious beliefs, in (6), the index of differences in cultural 
values, and in (7), all these four indices are added to the regression. All regressions include the bilateral controls 
that appear in Table 3. Source and destination country fixed effects are included. Standard errors clustered at 
country-pair appear beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) levels 
indicated. Instruments are a dummy of differences in legal origin and a dummy of common colonial history. F-
test is the F-statistics of the instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports the p-value from a Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions.  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Est. method  2SLS 2SLS  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Sample  US-UK  SP-HK    Full Full Full Full Full 
  excl.  excl.       
          
SECREGDIFF -0.2886 -0.2263  -0.264 -0.252 -0.1802  -0.255 -0.2395 
 0.1128***  0.1064**  0.0847***  0.0848***  0.071*** 0.098*** 0.0901*** 
RULELAWDIFF     -0.1897      -0.2325 
     0.0448***      0.0521*** 
GOVEFFDIFF       -0.0398    0.1648 
      0.1124    0.1277 
RELIGIONDIFF       -0.4823   -0.4124 
       0.1189***   0.1233*** 
CULTUREDIFF        -0.2189 -0.0248 
        0.1347 0.1471 
          
Fixed  effects YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES YES 
          
R2 0.83  0.88  0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 
# OBS  1100  1120  1249 1249 1179 1205 1136 
F-test 26.8  24.5  38.5 39.1 38.7 29.2 27.4 
OID-test   0.12  0.47  0.33 0.3  0.21 0.36 0.32 
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Table 9. The sign of the reverse causality 
The dependent variable is SECREGDIFF, the differences in securities regulation between countries i and j. 
Source and destination country fixed effects are included. Standard errors, clustered on country-pair, appear 
beneath the point estimates. Significance at 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10 percent (*) levels indicated. Instruments in 
the 2SLS-estimates are ln(POPi)×ln(POPj), ln(GDPi) ×ln(GDPj), and the absolute value of differences in the rule 
of law index. F-test is the F-statistics of the instruments from the first-stage regression. OID reports the p-value 
from a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. 
  (1) (2) 
Est. Method  OLS 2SLS 
    
ln(1+PORTINV) -0.1122  0.9439 
 0.0547**  0.4819** 
LEGDIFF 1.1901  1.4584 
 0.26***  0.2814*** 
COLONY -1.3956  -2.0048 
 0.746**  0.8532*** 
ln(DIST) 0.4189  0.8233 
 0.2365*  0.3077*** 
BORDER 1.1143  1.7828 
 0.5041**  0.5978*** 
COMLANG -0.5759  -0.9806 
 0.369  0.4419** 
ln(GDPPCDIFF) -0.15289  0.206 
 0.137024  0.2218 
ln(TRADE) -0.2582  -0.725 
 0.1571*  0.2932*** 
EU -0.1883  -0.8679 
 0.4185  0.5558 
USI -3.2643  -4.3403 
 0.7479***  0.906*** 
NAFTA -7.0142  -6.0984 
 0.9192***  1.003*** 
ANZERTA 4.9003  3.7554 
 0.768***  0.9818*** 
MERCOSUR 1.4441 -0.0896 
 0.8967*  1.1704 
ASEAN -1.3724  -2.2642 
 0.7985*  0.983** 
    
Fixed effects  YES  YES 
    
R2 0.36  0.29 
# OBS  1249  1249 
F-test   9.78 
OID   0.31 
 